State Secretary von Buelow on Germany's international position, August 1934 
 State Secretary von Buelow on Germany's international position, August 1934 
 Source: J. Noakes & G. Pridham, Documents on Nazism 1919-1945, (London, 1974). pp.512-513. 
 In judging the situation we should never overlook the fact that no kind of rearmament in the next few years could give us military security. Even apart from our isolation, we shall for a long time yet be hopelessly inferior to France in the military sphere. A particularly dangerous period will be 1934-35 on account of the reorganisation of the Reichswehr. Our only security lies in a skilful foreign policy and in avoiding all provocation. In so doing we must, of course, not only prevent the taking of military measures against Germany such as are being quite openly discussed in military circles abroad. In view of our isolation and our present weakness, economically and as regards foreign currency, our opponents need not even expose themselves to the hazards, the odium and the dangers of military measures. Without mobilising a single man or firing a single shot, they can place us in the most difficult situation by setting up a financial and economic blockade against us, either covert or overt. In a few of the most important countries 'mobilisation measures' for this purpose, within the framework of the economic sanctions in Article 16, have been in readiness for years. Nevertheless, in my view, we need not at the moment fear a preventive war. For France, Britain and other will first wait to see whether, and how, we shall deal with our economic and other difficulties. Their present restraint, however, must not make us think that they would still remain passive if they had nothing more to expect from German domestic difficulties and if we rearmed intensively. France and Britain also would then intervene, the more so as they could not permit an unlimited unilateral German rearmament. It would be wishful thinking to expect them to wait until we are strong enough to be a serious danger to them. They would probably demand guarantees regarding the extent and purpose of our armament even before we had recovered economically.